

## **Lafayette Gas Safety Alliance Meeting Notes**

Oct 1, 2021 - Zoom video call

### **Meeting Attendees**

**CPUC:** Terence Eng, Paul Penney, Dennis Lee

**PG&E:** David Buckley, Ian Schragg, Sarah Yoell, Darin Cline

**City of Lafayette:** Mayor Susan Candell, Councilmember Gina Dawson, Jonathan Fox

**Gas Safety Task Force:** Michael Dawson, Dennis Kuzak, Dave Kusters

### **Meeting Context**

This meeting is a continuing discussion to increase residents' assurance regarding gas safety in Lafayette as established at the Sept 2018 Council meeting with CPUC and PG&E.

### **Meeting Purpose/Objectives/Agenda**

This group meets quarterly to achieve the objective stated above: to increase trust in the safety of PG&E's gas operations in Lafayette. This meeting agenda focused on continuing concerns from the 2020-2021 TIMP audit completed by the SED: primarily HCA identification, testing schedules, CP. Also: Table-top exercise, leak surveys, improved communication.

### **Next Steps:**

- Residents to deliver in writing a list of Task Force questions to PG&E.
- Michael to share information with Ian Schragg about Growing Light preschool regarding issue of HCA site identification, and PG&E to respond.
- PG&E to follow-up on residents' request regarding if integrity testing of DFMs 3001-01 and 3002-01 can be moved up sooner than 2026 due to age of lines, proximity to neighborhoods, location of high wildfire zones.
- PG&E to follow-up on question if risk profile of Lafayette pipelines has increased given the 2021 NT-ILI and ECDA findings of L191-1, especially related to numerous incidents of corrosion and third-party damage findings.
- PG&E to provide where CP stations are located in Lafayette and historical coverage.
- Darin and Sarah to begin process of developing table-top exercise in Lafayette & Contra Costa County to simulate a response to a potential wildfire conflagration north of town.

## Meeting Notes:

1. **Introductions** - for a variety of reasons, several PG&E employees unable to attend: Bryon Winget, Bennie Barnes, Bronson Ingemansson. Sarah Yoell is new local public affairs rep. for Lamorinda.
2. **TIMP Audit: HCA Site Identification** - Paul said the recent audit was actually focused on Gina's many concerns listed in her letter. CPUC gave PG&E data requests to answer these questions. Gina said Girl Scout Camp not identified as an HCA site by PG&E for decades, lines not tested. She asked what is the rationale for not testing given age of pipeline, especially in high wildfire zone? Paul reviewed methodology of calculating. Gina said there are concerns that there are other locations not identified by PG&E. Paul said PG&E should have identified a long time ago, and it was a good find by residents. It will be tested in 2022. Paul had asked PG&E if there are other sites they have not identified, and PG&E told him no. Michael said the Lafayette Christian Church should be considered, PIR is 107' and Montessori school is within 50 feet. Ian said he researched, and every year he purchases licensing center databases from the state. He believes the structure behind the church is the preschool, church doesn't match HCA requirements because it's not used five days per week. Michael would like to follow-up because his information is different -- the Montessori is close to the pipeline and should be an identified site. Ian said he would follow-up and get to bottom of the issue, but regardless all the pipes there are considered HCA.
3. **TIMP Audit: HCA Integrity Testing** - Gina said most of that HCA line is not integrity tested and installed in the 50s. Why hasn't this been tested, as they are HCA and run through our neighborhoods? Gina asked why PG&E's priority isn't doing integrity assessment to get a baseline? We need confirmation of the schedule and would like it expedited ahead of 2026 -- oldest pipeline is 1953 install date. Ian said they are happy to follow-up. There are multiple assessments other than strength tests, and they could have met code requirements for integrity assessment in other ways. Gina recognized these are former distribution feeder mains, and they were recognized as transmission lines by PG&E back in 2014. Maybe HCA lags behind identification and may be designated in 2016, but still a 10 year lag time is a concern for residents. The other DFM 3002 runs under downtown business core, along reservoir to Orinda and is high fire zone. Residents need to know if this 1950's line is correctly identified as HCA, and if testing can happen sooner than later. Pipelines have older weld technology, and although not high pressure, residents would want better assurances of integrity of this pipeline because they are in a high wildfire zone. PG&E replied they will follow up, and they confirmed DFMs 3001 & 3002 were changed as definition to transmission line in 2016, so they did not have HCA identification before then. Gina reminded the group that we understand these DFMs had issues around lack of cathodic protection, lack of shut off valves.
4. **TIMP Audit - Risk Assessments** - Michael asked: given the recent findings after non-traditional ILI and ECDA to inspect & fix coatings on some of the 69 corrosion sites on L191-1 downtown, does that increase risk profile of other pipelines downtown? PG&E said that's a good question, will follow-up. David Buckley said he's familiar with work done downtown. They already have third-party damage threat in general identified, so no

change in assumptions. But agrees more details needed if there is a higher risk ranking because of it.

5. **Discussions on TIMP issues** - David said changing the DFMs to transmission did not change operational plans based on change of definition. It will trigger HCA and inspections later on, but doesn't change day to day operations. Darin said in 2016 definition change of pipelines came when they started the CPSI program. Darin opined that Montessori school may be in violation of their licensing to operate. Darin says when they get the licensing data, it's not always correct. They've seen it in other places, and they had to hash through the data. Gina said PG&E should have caught these types of issues while doing centerline survey or regular patrols. Darin said they didn't pick up the Girl Scout camp, and thought it was a farm, because there might not have been anyone on site. Darin says they get the data, then walk the pipe, and then determine. Gina pointed out this lack of identification has been an ongoing problem for PG&E for decades.

Gina said there are 920 miles of transmission pipeline converted from DFM from 2014 gas safety report. Still not sure why lag time in getting defined. Was it federal regulations? Darin said they are regulated federally; there is also PIPA (gas industry group) that makes recommendations for guidelines they follow. Ian is program manager for threat identification. Just to clarify, Ian said in 2014 PG&E put out a statement, but it took in effect 2016. Gina asked if Ian can describe the conversation. He said it's in the procedures regarding location of pipeline compared to other pipelines and operating pressure of the pipeline. DFM are low pressures, and PG&E lowered the threshold for definition. It has to do with yield strength, lower SMYS 10-30% (approx.) was DFMs before. Gina said lines in Lafayette range from 170-330 psi. PG&E said current definition they adopted in 2016, it's about % SMYS and how the line fits in with system, depending on type of customers & regulation stations. That means some pipelines under 20% SMYS still considered transmission pipe. David said this is just definition change, not an operational change, and this was a conservative move to trigger integrity management. Represents a move in the right direction.

Gina said our concerns come from seeing fireball in lower pressure distribution line in San Francisco, and seeing our dry neighborhoods in fire zone with higher pressure lines. Mayor Candell confirmed 46% of Lafayette is in very high severity fire zone. Darin said PG&E is looking at everything in 70,000 sq. mi. territory to prioritize in right way. Darin's concern with Lafayette is that high fire threat has increased in last few years, and is that being considered since it's a priority in Lafayette. He and Sarah to bring back these issues. Darin said SF ignition was protected by water curtains in 10 minutes; it took longer than expected because ignition and other reasons. They are training fire department to make things safe quickly. PG&E knows how to make it safe, and they want people to know. Gina expressed appreciation on this assurance.

6. **Cathodic Protections** - Michael asked where CP stations are located, how it looks in Lafayette, and how is it monitored. PG&E said they have CP records, will need to follow-up. In general, 100% of pipeline is required to be CP protected. Darin said this was part of the discussions they had about DFMs a few years ago. PG&E said they are being monitored: they have dedicated crews, mechanics & field specialists. Their job is to read CP system

and do maintenance 100% of the time. Code requires approximately one CP station per mile, and PG&E said they have more in spots. The specialists read at bi-annually or annual basis. Information is aggregated to give CP health on any pipeline. Everything must have CP, and PG&E ensures it does. It must minimum strength value electrically, and then allowed to vary within a range to be considered protected. PG&E checks on a regular basis, and they can verify how it is taken care of. Darin mentioned concerned about tree roots interfering with CP, but Gina reminded group that the PG&E studies concluded tree roots don't shield CP.

Gina said PG&E found corrosion in 191-B and 191-1 downtown which had existing CP, and with this project, put in more CP stations. She asked so what other areas indicate PG&E might need more CP stations, given the indicators of the lines with corrosion? Does PG&E need to look at CP more closely? Darin said they look on a regular basis, he has been in the field, and this is the one thing he's confident about.

Michael mentioned there's at least one CP station that's been visibly broken for at least two years. Darin said his confidence level is highest on what he can see vs. what he cannot see, so his confidence is high with CP. Darin said he wants to see a picture. Michael mentioned residents are looking for a local review of the CP program, want to see PG&E be proactive vs. reactive and not just say they fixed it, like with the concern we brought to PG&E about hanging trees over exposed pipelines. David said he understands the need to have an indicator of the health of PG&E's operations. David there could also be reasons why it's not being fixed, like the line being abandoned. PG&E said it would be nice to know specifics to follow-up.

PG&E then reiterated Gina's question if CP system is good, how do you find corrosion at same time? Gina said yes, the instances of corrosion you had to find on L191-B was an immediate anomaly for fixing. David remembers the repair there and said even with good CP, there can be other things that shield the protection. So PG&E has coatings, but these can be damaged by third party digging, rock damage, etc. David said there can be good CP coverage, but also localized issues. PG&E overlays mitigations with integrity assessments in "Swiss cheese" model (i.e., not everything is perfect, so multiple layers provide better protection.) Darin mentioned app for the public to report issues for visible PG&E gas and electrical safety issues and said they need help looking at such large system. Gina said that was required by CPUC.

- 7. Need for Local Threat Identifications** - Gina said start of the Alliance group was to see if PG&E was really looking at our local threats. We heard all the good PR about activities, but what we were seeing on the ground were safety issues like trees over exposed pipelines. One thing we could do is solve how we have a local look. Perhaps there's an engineer for ILI, one for CP, etc. who brings it all together? David said he interacts with all groups and is that local connection: the ILI group moves across the system, the corrosion team works on projects across the system, but David only does transmission pipeline in the Diablo & North Bay Division, and he's the only local transmission pipeline engineer. Darin said PG&E is redoing how they touch customers and how they do safety. He said that PG&E is regionalizing into 5 regions to provide a more local touch. Aaron Johnson is new VP and was introduced already to Supervisor John Gioya. They will have

new safety officers. Bay Area Region is our region. Customer Division Leads will report to the VP of the area. It was Vic Baker, but a new person will be assigned. The Bay Area Team meets every day for 15 minutes to review what is working/not working. Lately it was about Richmond pole fires. Darin thinks it has increased response time by PG&E. Applies to both gas & electric. Darin said this would have helped in Lafayette a long time ago. Other regions: North Coast, South Bay, Central Valley, etc. They're all different, and maybe in future rates will be different. Five different safety divisions.

Residents expressed appreciation for this local connection, primarily preventative but also planning. Gina said there are plans to replace pipeline L191-1 beneath the bridge at Leigh Creekside Park -- we'd like to be part of these discussions, and not have pipeline moved into park. Darin wishes people in field would not discuss projects due to misunderstandings. Community engagement/involvement hasn't happened in the past and it should.

Gina said there's long lead time to plan. Our efforts are all about identifying and reducing threats in a prioritized manner. It's important and started when PG&E came to Lafayette for the CPSI program. Since then, we've found many other issues we've been able to collaborate on, and residents appreciate that work. Residents thank the SED division, and all the participants at PG&E who attend these meetings. Darin said residents should feel free to send written questions to PG&E about the closure letter, and they'd be happy to answer those questions. Residents have additional questions.

8. **Table-Top Exercise proposal** - Dennis (Lafayette resident and catastrophic risk expert) discussed the need to prepare for an event on the pipeline, and the need to make sure everything works well since there are a number of agencies involved. In the case of a fire, there will be lots of communications to ensure that the fire is put out ASAP. Dennis said FEMA website is a good resource for planning exercises. His background is in earthquake engineering, risk management & catastrophic risk; he thinks about low probability & high consequence events such as San Bruno. "Black Swan" events can be more common than understood. Dennis asked if PG&E uses table-top exercises? Darin said yes, PG&E employees are trained in ICS (Incident Command System) for incident management. PG&E has places for emergency response centers. Public Safety Supervisors are assigned to a county to react to emergencies at a county level & with Darin at city level. PSS work under Darin and meet with fire chiefs 1-2x per year to review training. They do tabletop exercises. The Geary gas pipeline fire event was an example of a response. Currently, exercises are focused on wildfires and PSPS for shutting off electricity. Emergency planning and response group is robust & how they interface with fire & police.

Dennis said these regional disasters will need the many organizations communicating together, and it's best to learn how these events can occur before they happen. He's concerned about a scenario within Briones Regional Park and L-191 potentially triggering a fire. If winds coming out of the N or NE this time of year, Lafayette & Orinda would be in immediate serious jeopardy. Response would need to start with where a fire would start in a remote area. This scenario would be a good table-top exercise since it would be the worst event for our community. Maybe PG&E can apply existing exercises doing something particular to Lafayette? We have older pipelines than San Bruno with older style welds.

We need to know what the City & County is going to do. Needed experts from fire, police, ENT, evacuations, etc. to create a community response plan.

Darin said tabletop would be ideal, and would want to bring police, fire, and public safety supervisors. Darin says he knows how dense Briones is because their guys walk the line and since it takes 2 days, they have to camp out. They also have cameras and are watching the forest. They have HAWC (Hazard Awareness Warning Center): San Ramon people looking for wildfire, earthquake hazards 24/7. Put up 1200 weather stations. PG&E knows which direction winds are blowing. HAWC also has ignition tracker. In Lafayette, the Police Chief is technically the emergency services director. PG&E would want to bring in County emergency services too. When that could happen isn't certain, but Darin said the public safety supervisor will inform the Police Chief about what PG&E is doing with the fire department. Darin said he and Sarah will work on bringing everyone together. Michael asked the EBRPD to be included. Darin offered to show residents the HAWC center in San Residents. Dennis said that's good, there's a need for unified command and to identify all the moving parts before an accident happens. Fire is greater risk than an earthquake. Regionalization under PG&E will help. Gina said that all should happen, and this group can help answer about shut-off valves: where they're located, how hard to get to them (Briones at top of hill). What if we had incident within Briones and could not get to the valves. This look could be done more immediately instead of waiting for the other organizations. Mayor Candell said Springhill neighborhood is extra complicated because the road to Briones is a single lane road that would require emergency vehicles blocking evacuations. Darin said this can be included in tabletop exercise, both evacuations and infrastructure questions. Evacuations changed since Paradise, has improved. Gina said emergency team in Lafayette have been a model for the region.

9. **MEETING WRAP UP** - Gina reminded the group again that residents wish PG&E to prioritize highest risk issues on pipeline first. She asked if that is driven by regulatory requirements? Paul said yes, that's required within TIMP program to identify threats on HCA segments and perform risk assessment based on risk algorithm, and prioritize highest risk score issues first. Gina said we're looking for this prioritization, and with new HCA, adds energy for asking Darin to request budgetary consideration to address our unknowns.

Sarah said she's point of contact for Mayor, Council & City department heads. She provided her phone number. She is sending out emails and monthly update every month to Mayor and Council. Ian and David can be contacted in the future, but also send to Sarah and Darin to centralize.

10. Residents expressed appreciation for involvement of all attendees. The next meeting will be held next quarter.